digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

2005

If I Implore You and Order You to Set Me Free
Robert Blecker
New York Law School, robert.blecker@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
49 N. Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 561 (2004-2005)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

IF I IMPLORE YOU AND ORDER YOU TO SET ME FREE
ROBERT BLECKER*

Determined to resume his mission to secure the homeland,
Odysseus took leave of the beautiful goddess Circe who loved him
passionately. She warned him: deadly perils lie between you and
your homecoming. Deadliest of all were the Sirens, with their
sweet, alluring, but fatal song. You could never reach the Sirens.
The bones of those who had tried littered the rocks around them.
Before resuming their journey, Odysseus called his men together. "I do not think it right that only one or two should know, so
I will tell you all, and when we all know, we may die or escape" 1 with
our eyes open. Odysseus, the Sovereign, told them everything well, almost everything. He omitted one small detail: in the end,
only he would make it back alive.
As they approached the Sirens, Odysseus commanded his men
- he was the unquestioned sovereign - his word, absolutely binding law. Put wax in your ears, but not in mine. Bind me to the
mast, and row like hell. Whatever I might say under the influence
of the Sirens, ignore it, and keep rowing. And "if I implore you, and
order you to set me free, you must tie me tighter. "2
As predicted, the Sirens' call was overwhelming, and Odysseus
strained at his ropes, begging his men to unplug their ears, untie
him, and give in to the moment's temptation. I know what I told
you before, but ignore it and do what I tell you now. 3
He was bound, but they were in a bind; Odysseus' command
was law. And now he was ordering them to unplug their ears, and
untie him. Only by feeling bound by the earlier command, however,
could they free themselves from fatal, collective self-destruction.

* Professor of Constitutional History and Criminal Law, New York Law School.
J.D. Harvard Law School, 1974; B.A. Tufts University, 1969; Harvard Fellow in Law and
Humanities, 1976-1977.
l. HOMER, THE OovssEY 141 (W.H.D. Rouse trans., 1937).
2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. See id. at 141-42 ("So they sang in lovely tones. From the bottom of my heart I
longed to listen, and I ordered the men to set me free, nodding my head and working
my brows; but they simply went on pulling with a good swing.").
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When the future became the present and the past still controlled,
there, then, in that moment, constitutionalism was born.
Constitutionalism itself arises from the sacrifice of the ad hoc
for the rule bound. Constitutionalism at its core essentially requires self-restraint. We who would enjoy the lasting benefits of a
constitution must recognize at a rational moment that in the future, temptations will lead to actions which, if not fatal, we will live
later to deeply regret. The great pragmatic constitutional challenge
haunts us constantly: how can the sovereign effectively limit its own
power consistent with a continuing command adequate to the perilous journey?
Time and space prohibit extended discussion here, 4 but let me
suggest briefly some instances of Odysseus at the Mast: first as a
snapshot of our basic constitutional structure; next as a metaphor
for the dynamic tension between continuity and change in our system of government; and finally as a problem, if not a paradox, for
today's world, struggling to stay the course of freedom and human
dignity.

I.

THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

In the United States, as in any real republic, Sovereign Power
ultimately resides in the body of the People. But at a calm and
rational moment, the People realize that they will be apt to get carried away at just those times when they can least afford - and will
later most regret - it. So the People entrust power to their representatives, thereby placing it beyond their own control to dictate to
4. As students in my Constitutional History course will attest, I have been developing and teaching this metaphor in depth since 1978, each semester devoting a whole
class to it. I originally prepared and delivered these comments in ignorance of, and
independent of, a growing literature. Research, however, now reveals that others have
subsequently developed this metaphor, often in substantially similar ways. Time pressure prohibits exhaustive search and quotation, but interested readers should consult
the work principally of: joN ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALl"IY
AND IRRATIONALl"IY 93-96 (1979); and his later book ULYSSES UNBOUND (2000), which
includes a bibliography. Recent essays employing the metaphor and overlapping much
of this talk are: Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling &le ofDemocratic Constitutionalism: Fixed
Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1985 (2003);
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REv. 605
(2003); and Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of
the Sroenteenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 500 (1997).
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those representatives, and then divide that power in an Odysseuslike move between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches.
A.

The Legislative Branch

"The Senate," Madison declared in the 63rd Federalist, "may
be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the
community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free
governments, ultimately prevail ... so there are particular moments
. . . when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion . . . may call for
measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament
and condemn." 5
The Constitution - the creature of the people - must contain, in Madison's words "a safeguard against the tyranny of their own
passions." 6 How did we accomplish this? Most obviously by providing six-year terms for each elected Senator. These long terms were
originally designed to insulate U.S. Senators from the state legislatures that selected them, and now from the very People each represents. Buttressing this insulation, the founding generation
consciously rejected immediate past practice and placed it outside
the electors' power to instruct their Senators to vote a certain way.
Although the state legislatures which selected them might passionately desire a particular vote on a particular issue, Senators retain
the power and acquire a responsibility to resist that pressure and
instead to keep an eye on the long-term best interests of the People.
The Founders also placed it outside the power of the People to recall the Senator from office, however furious they may be at this
moment. Absent impeachment for a crime, the six-year term was
simply fixed.
The Founders also decided to reject term limits, or "forced rotation" for members of Congress. On the one hand, periodically
forcing out representatives would seem to return power closer to
the People by ensuring fresh blood circulating in Congress, retarding an insular and aristocratic self-perpetuating ruling class, and
forcing members to return to their lives as private citizens under
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 384 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
6. Id.
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the influence of the laws they had enacted. On the other hand,
imposing term limits, as the more populist anti-federalists originally
- but unsuccessfully - advocated and the amended Constitution
now provides with the Executive, is an Odysseus-like move, placing
it outside the power of the People to send whom they wish for as
long as they wish to represent them. 7 To a lesser extent, the Founders also showed self-restraint in the House of Representatives with
its shorter two-year term and, like the Senate, not subject to instruction or recall.

B.

The judicial Branch

By giving all federal court judges life tenure, the Founders consciously insulated them from the public passions of the moment.
Although seemingly out of touch with popular "wisdom," the past
reaches out to restrain the people.
Ultimately, however, not only do the People restrain themselves through the Court, but the Court too, must restrain itself. It
must not "make law" by substituting its own views of good policy for
those of the People's representatives. It must not strike down legislation as "unconstitutional" that seems stupid, offensive, or ineffective. In short, the Court must restrain its own passion.
In 1972, for example, a bare majority of Justices in Funnan v.
Georgi,d3 outlawed the death penalty as applied across the United
States by characterizing it as "cruel and unusual" and thus violative
of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, revealed
"an excruciating agony of the spirit," reiterating his own deep personal "distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death
penalty." 9 And although "personally ... rejoic[ing] at the Court's
result," 10 conceding that as a legislator he would vote against the
death penalty, and as a governor he would exercise executive clemency, the Justice voted to leave it to the states to decide for themselves. Restraining his own passion, he refused to invoke the Eighth
Amendment: "We should not allow our personal preferences as to
the wisdom of legislative and congressicnal action, or our distaste
7.
8.
9.
10.

Cf Bybee, supra note 4, at 530-35.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 405.
Id. at 414.
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for such action, to guide our judicial decision . . . . The temptations
to cross that policy line are very great. In fact, as today's decision
reveals, they are almost irresistible." 11
Justice Powell also dissented:
It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of wisdom to prevail,
to disregard ones own strongly held view of what is wise in the
conduct of affairs. But it is not the business of this Court to
pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Court's giving
effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That
self-restraint is of the essence . . . of the judicial oath. 12

Thus, by giving the court lifetime tenure, the People at a rational moment placed it out of their own power to act on their anger and remove the judges from office. And only by giving federal
judges lifetime tenure could We provide for its effective correlative:
judicial review. We, the People, empower you, the judges, to nullify
the expressed will even of our own representatives when you honestly discern that this momentary passion contradicts past, deeplyheld, contrary assurances.
Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist in Furman summed it up best
for the four dissenters who wrestled with 'judicial review in a democratic society": "How can government ... by the federal judiciary,
whose members are constitutionally insulated from responsiveness
to the popular will, declare invalid laws duly enacted by the popular
branches of government?" 13 While unconstitutional exercise of
power by the executive and legislative branches of the government
is subject to judicial restraint, "the only check upon our own exercise of
power is our own sense of self-restraint . . . . Judicial self-restraint is
surely an implied, if not an expressed, condition of the grant of
authority of judicial review."14
In sum, the People restrained themselves, first by electing representatives, then empowering a life-tenured judiciary to check
those representatives, and also to check themselves.
11.
12.
added).
13.
14.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 411.
Id. at 433 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119-20 (1958)) (emphasis
Furman, 408 U.S. at 466.
Id. at 467, 470 (emphasis added).
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The Executive Branch

The Founders also empowered the Executive to restrain the
Legislature by veto. The President, a single individual, trumps the
representatives of a majority - even an overwhelming majority and will be sustained by a small minority - 1/3 + 1 - of either
house. In the selection of the President, the Founders, while generally adhering to popular sovereignty, nevertheless utilized an electoral college in an Odysseus-like decision again to insulate the
selection from the popular will.
And, subsequently, we have also limited the Executive to two
terms. Suppose we desperately need and overwhelmingly want our
beloved Commander-in-Chief to continue as President during a
time of crisis? Too bad. We see ourselves as too tempted to maintain the status quo and, thus, in a rational moment by Constitutional
amendment, have placed the future-present outside our power to
control.
II.

CONTINUITY

AND

CHANGE IN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

We pride ourselves as a maturing society, searching for human
dignity; embracing evolving standards of decency; discovering, devising, expanding and sometimes even discarding rights. We feel
challenged at once to grow and evolve, yet also continue at the core
on a course we set long ago. Again, Odysseus at the Mast is the
operative metaphor for this great dynamic tension. We can see in
our system of government by our basic laws - i.e., the rights we
take for granted, the method by which we amend those rights, and
the rights we cannot amend, attempts to act freely in the present
while being bound by the past.

A.

Laws and Rights

A law - an authoritative rule which decides a case by criteria
specified in advance - is itself an instance that shows an advanced
commitment to sacrifice present inclination to a fixed and settled
policy from the recent past. Representatives codify the majority's
will, which articulates "good" public policy - good primarily because the majority desires it.
In the Odyssey, however, above and beyond ordinary law Odysseus' present commands - there emerged a higher law: ig-
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nore my command and keep on rowing. The need for higher law
to restrain passions destructive of the common good, as Madison
explained so brilliantly and clearly in the Federalist Papers, 15 comes
from the tyrannical threat posed by the most dangerous faction of
all - the majority.
Today, the vast majority of Americans may be in favor of
rounding up all suspected terrorists and their supporters, holding
them without warrants, torturing them for their information, and
quietly killing those who would attack us. Perhaps a majority would
support doing the same to those who rape and kill our children.
The majority may also favor silencing the unpatriotic who, in times
of great national tragedy, cheer the success of the enemy.
But rights are trumps, as Ronald Dworkin declares. 16 A defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial, or free speech, trumps the
People's emotion of the moment. Rights are real, only if key actors
in the system rationally commit themselves in advance to restrain
passions of the moment, including their own.
Thus, for example, post-Saddam Iraq struggles to enact a constitutional republic, which can at once reflect majority status of the
Shiites, while at the same time preserving the autonomy of the Sunnis and Kurds. Advocates of republican government search for a
framework that will make a working reality of republicanism's essential credo: majority rule that respects minority rights.
But how can we guarantee that once the balance is struck, it
will continue unchanged and yet adaptable to circumstances different from what gave it birth? What do we do with rights that no
longer feel right, with restraints that no longer liberate?

B.

The Amendment Process

Consider the amendment process itself: a process by which we
revoke what we have initially guaranteed. But again the metaphor
applies: we consciously make it cumbersome. In order to alter the
Constitution, two-thirds of each branch of Congress must initiate
the amendment and a majority of three-fourths of state legislatures
must ratify it. Why can we not more easily translate our evolving
15.
16.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See RONALD DWORIUN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977) ("Individual rights
are political trumps when held by individuals.").
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standards of decency, our growing wisdom, into Constitutional protection? Because we know ourselves. We know we will mistake momentary passion for permanent wisdom and insight. So we restrain
our ability to change our collective mind.
But change, while cumbersome, is still possible. Some may see
this as a modification, if not an outright rejection, of the mast metaphor.17 I think it partakes of its spirit. Many years ago at the U.S.
Naval Academy during a post-performance discussion of my antifederalist monologue "Vote NO!'', a faculty member suggested a different metaphor which better captures this sense of retardation
short of absolute binding restraint: the Constitution, he said, is like
a sea anchor. A sea anchor, as he explained, does not keep a boat
absolutely fixed to a spot. Rather, during stormy weather, we intentionally drag it behind to stabilize us in rough waters. A sea anchor
simply slows us down while keeping us more steadily, although
more slowly, on course.
The Founders did attempt, however, to put one provision of
the Constitution out of our own power forever to alter, much as
Odysseus had attempted with the Sirens. Immediately following the
amendment procedures, Article V itself concludes: "Provided ...
that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate."18
Even this arguably fails as a pristine example: Odysseus sought
to protect against any change in command even by unanimous consent, his own included. Whereas in the United States, it is conceivable that a momentary democratic fervor might move all fifty state
legislatures - including the relatively unpopulated states - to surrender their own disproportionate influence and abolish equal representation in the Senate.
Furthermore, the deviously clever could object that Article V is
itself, like any other clause of the Constitution, potentially subject
to amendment. A determined supermajority short of unanimity
17. Cf ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 92-94 (2000). Issacharoff also suggests, "Ulysses
bound himself in such a way as to make it impossible for him to yield to the Sirens'
song. By contrast, most constitutional constraints, such as the supermajority requirements of Article V, are designed to retard rather than prohibit the exercise of the popular will - the overeater who locks his refrigerator does not necessarily throw away the
key." See Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1992.
18. U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
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could first amend Article V by removing the unanimity required to
alter one-state one-vote, and then make the Senate proportionately
representative. 19

C.

Unalienable Rights

Are there no limits to a determined supermajority's capacity to
subvert substantive constitutional guarantees while at the same time
strictly adhering to constitutional procedures? Is there no concept
by which we can forever place it out of our power to violate human
dignity even by constitutional formulae? Can rights be enshrined
and protected even against a supermajority carried away by passionate desire to revoke them? Not strictly within a Constitutional
framework, especially when the claim to continuity is stripped of
moral obligation and invested solely by deep procedural necessity. 20
We are bound by the Original Understanding, the claim goes, only
because we need to be bound by something and, although arbitrary
at the beginning, time and success eventually convey legitimacy.
It's a little like driving on the right side of the road and stopping at
red lights. "Tradition," a philosopher once declared, "is the forgetting of Origins." Understood this way, 21 truly irreversible limits are
impossible and unreal.
19. In 1992, when Quebec looked like it was about to secede, political leaders in a
"do-or-die" effort to preserve Canada's unity, offered constitutional changes including a
House and Senate with a guarantee to Quebec that however its population may decline,
"its overall parliamentary representation - Senate and House would NEVER drop below
25 percent." See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Lawmakers Provide Plans on Constitutional Change
in Keep Canada United, N.Y. TIMES, August 23, 1992, at 14 (emphasis added). The present struggle over a provisional and now permanent Constitution for Iraq might well
result in a similar provision and problem. Cf ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 101-105 (2000)
(discussing amendment procedures).
20. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
138, 139 (1920) ("The law ... is indeed ... the government of the living by the dead.
To a very considerable extent no doubt it is inevitable that the living should be so
governed. The past gives us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our imagination; we
cannot get away from it. There is, too, a peculiar logical pleasure in making manifest
the continuity between what we are doing and what has been done before. But the
present has a right to govern itself so far as it can; and it ought always to be
remembered that historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity.").
21. Issacharoff mostly denies moral legitimacy of the Founding generation, and
rests binding obligation of constitutional limits on a common recognition by those out
of power - today's losers but potentially tomorrow's winners - that their turn in the
future can be assured only if they respect present arrangements. It doesn't matter how
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The American Revolution, however, supplies moral legitimacy
to the Founding Generation above and beyond the happenstance
that it designed and ratified the U.S. Constitution. The Declaration
of Independence - our most sacred secular article of faith - is a
prime instance of Odysseus at the Mast: "We hold these truths to
be self-evident" - beyond disproof, beyond dispute - "that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights .... "22 Unalienable rights - life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness - are by definition rights that
cannot be denied. By the Declaration of Independence, we fundamentally place it outside our own power, for example, to sell ourselves into slavery.23
Ironically then, those of us who, like Odysseus, allow the past
to bind the future when it becomes the present, must disagree with
Jefferson, the Declaration's principal author, who elsewhere declared the earth belongs entirely to the living, to each generation
"during its course, fully, and in their own right." 24 Thus, "no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law." 25
For Jefferson, then, "the dead have neither powers nor rights over
it." 26 Constitutionalists instead would side with Madison who countered his dear friend and insisted that, "the improvements made by
the dead form a charge against the living who take the benefit of
them. This charge can no otherwise be satisfied than by executing
the will of the dead."2 7 Perhaps Edmund Burke best characterized
"the great primeval contract of eternal society" as "a partnership
we do it, as long as we do it by accepted - if arbitrary - rules. For the ancient Greeks,
long accepted conventions - nomos in physis - acquired a near natural status. An
Originalist, however, seeks legitimacy beneath the accident of the Founders being the
initial designer.
22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
23. See EI.STER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 102 (2000) ("Some constitutions offer absolute
entrenchment of rights. Art. 79(3) of the German constitution says that the basic rights
are immune to revision. Similarly, Article 57 of the Bulgarian constitution says that
fundamental rights are irrevocable."). In a footnote, however, Elster suggests that Article 158 in the Bulgarian constitution implies that Article 57 is itself amendable.
24. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), available at
http:/ /wwwJuntosociety.com/i_documents/tjjm.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2004).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), available at
http:/ /wwwJuntosociety.com/i_documents/~m_tj.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2004).
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not only between those who are living, but between those who are
living, those who are dead, and those who are about to be born." 28
Originalists who feel bound by the dead hand of the Founders
confront the great paradox that only because the Founding Generation fashioned, fought, and won the American Revolution - fundamentally changing government - did they acquire the moral
legitimacy essentially to bind us to continue their understanding
and forever, even by revolution, place it out of our own power to
reject human dignity life, liberty, equality, and individual
happiness.

III.

PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES OF THE MAsT

In its dynamic application to real ·life situations, the metaphor
seems increasingly problematic and paradoxical if not downright
self-contradictory.

A.

Life Without Parole

In his Second Treatise on Civil Government, John Locke defined "political power" as "a right of making laws with Penalties of
Death, and consequently all lesser Penalties." 29
Of course in designing and inflicting punishment, the People
and their representatives must restrain their own passions. An especially brutal crime might stoke our passion, and our urge to punish
might be misdirected at the innocent or fail to take into account
mitigating circumstances. Thus, we have forced restraint upon ourselves by requiring due process, circumscribing trials through jury
selection that excludes those who cannot be dispassionate or compassionate. We also adopt and apply rules that exclude evidence if
its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, and we require a
jury to find guilt only when they are convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt. And even then, we provide for appeals.
These devices and others essentially cabin our urge to act immediately by restraining passion long enough to investigate and deliberate. To be reliably and fairly administered, the death penalty
28. EDMUND BuRKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 110 (Dolphin ed.
1961) (1790).
29. JOHN E. LocKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690). Our founders embraced this essay as the philosophical justification for America's revolution.
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must operate as a deliberate product of a deliberative process. All
this is well established, but obscured perhaps is the committment
underlying life without parole - the penultimate punishment that
most death penalty opponents view as the only moral alternative.
By this ultimate exercise of Sovereign power short of death itself, We, the living, presently so attuned to this vicious killer's evil
that we feel certain - now and for always - that however much he
may grow or be transformed as a human being, he must be confined for life. Regardless of whether the convict is now fully rehabilitated, we irrevocably pledge and bind ourselves: This convicted
killer shall never be set free.
In meting out Life Without Parole ("LWOP"), we guard against
the future passion not of rage and disgust that presently move us,
but against the rationally anticipated decay of anger and the sense
of forgiveness or mercy that will replace it someday when we would
focus exclusively on the living criminal and forget the victim of the
past. How can it serve human dignity to continue to cage a
changed, non-threatening, harmless person, who seems genuinely
to regret his mistakes?
But we have made a covenant with that past - that we shall not
forget nor forgive; neither review nor revise - a covenant which we
bind ourselves to keep. Thus we reject the problematic question,
"What good will it do?" and instead continue to focus on the bad
that has been done.
Perhaps LWOP, then, is not so much the Odysseus-like past
reason protecting against present passion, as a punishment that depends on present passion protecting against future passion; 30 or
perhaps it is present, engaged, and informed emotion protecting
against a future, detached rationality - rejecting forever the cost30. See ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 19 (2000) ("Sometimes, people precommit
themselves in a moment of passion to prevent themselves from yielding to another passion at a later time."). Although he does not apply the metaphor to our collective
choice of life without parole, ultimately confining it to individuals, Elster does cite Racine's Andromaque where a rejected lover calls for the immediate death of her exparamour. "While he still Jives, fear lest I pardon him. Suspect my wavering anger till
his death. Tomorrow I may love him if today he dies not." Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
"We may use a precommitment device to prevent a change in preferences, or at least to
disable ourselves from acting on changed preferences." Id. at 57. Elster comes close to
the insight that life without parole provides, suggesting an addict's strategy of "throwing
away the key" to disable himself. Id. at 64.
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benefit analysis that asks, "what good can it do to continue this punishment?"31 I have visited with these murderers, sometimes decades
after their dastardly deeds, and too often, hearing their gentle sighs
and genuine regrets, I too cannot help but wonder "what is the
point of punishing these lifers until death?" Thus, while we have
bound ourselves to continue to punish until death, we cannot help
but wonder sometimes why?
Whatever it is, LWOP is ultimately Odysseus-like because it creates a binding commitment at this moment not to think differently
or feel different when the future becomes the present and the present is the past.32

B.

The Boundary Problem

These fairly brief comments only begin to scratch the surface
and hardly exhaust the potential reach and power of the metaphor
to illuminate diverse realms, such as the necessity for, and limits to,
openness in government: recall, the wise Odysseus shared with his
men, the perils that faced them. He told his men the truth - almost. The metaphor also introduces a distinction between the Sovereign in his or her private and public capacity. Privately, Odysseus
is a weak man subject to and driven by passion, but in his public
capacity, he is a wise man governed and restrained by reason. A
growing literature must reveal other dimensions to this metaphor.
In closing, however, let's return to the action, with Odysseus
bound to the mast, desperately struggling to annul his earlier command: "From the bottom of my heart I longed to listen, and I ordered the men to set me free." 33 I tried to say untie me to the crew,
"nodding my head and working my brows, but they went on pulling
... the oars ... and put more ropes round me and fastened me
tighter." 34
31. See ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 24 (2000) (briefly extending the standard metaphor of reason constraining passion to "cases of a passionate agent precommitting himself against dispassionateness" and also to the "case of a rational agent pre-committing
himself against [future contrary) rationality").
32. Of course even here we back off from absolutely binding commitments although death penalty abolitionists rarely acknowledge it. The governor - the Executive - may pardon or commute a life without parole sentence to make parole available.
33. HOMER, su-pra note 1, at 141-42.
34. Id. at 142.
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So far so good: Reason has triumphed. Notice, however, that
the ending is flawed in a way which Homer failed to consider and
continues to challenge us today: "But when we had gone a long way
past the Sirens, so that we could hear them no longer, my companions
took out the wax from their ears and untied my ropes." 35
We could no longer hear them? His men never heard the Sirens at all. Consider that moment when Odysseus alone could still
hear, but only faintly, their alluring call. Presumably the Sirens'
destructive power diminishes with the square of the hearer's distance from them. A clever Odysseus, no longer so out of control as
to evidence his madness, but still under their spell, could scheme
his way to the Sirens by going limp at the mast. His men would
then take the wax out of their ears, mistakenly relying on his assurance - his apparent return to rationality - that the danger had
passed. Then, together having heard the Sirens faintly, they would
vainly seek to reach them, and all would die in the attempt.
Wisdom of the ages informs us that no person should judge his
own case. Yet who else could police that evanescent boundary between ordinary times and emergency situations?
Self-reference remains a deep, paradoxical, constitutional flaw.
In considering a controversy between the Executive & the Legislative, the Court decides its own jurisdiction: the Court must not take
jurisdiction where it has none, but it alone decides whether it may
decide. The national government in a federal republic must police
the boundary between its own and local power. The President may,
but must not, pardon himself. The House must impeach its own
and the Senate remove its own offending member. "This statement
is false" - is true only if it's false and false only if it's true. Constitutional self-reference is part, perhaps the heart, of the boundary
problem, which remains as insoluble in politics as it has been in
mathematics.
C.

Emergencies and Prerogative

At its core, Odysseus at the Mast stands for the pragmatic necessity to suspend the ordinary rule and substitute emergency mea35.

HOMER,

supra note 1, at 142 (emphasis added).
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sures. 36 And when the emergency has passed, again to resume the
ordinary course. But how do we know when the emergency is over?
Odysseus was forced to judge when the danger had passed and his
own rationality had returned. 37 Very troubling, but then, who else
could have been relied upon to make that decision?
Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures sometimes.
Locke himself, the great revolutionary, called for the exercise
of executive prerogative within a well-working constitutional plan.
As he defined it, prerogative was the right to go outside the rules in
an emergency for the good of the whole, later to be confirmed by
the whole. 38
Executive prerogative is, and has been a great challenge to republican government. In the Ship's Money Casr!'9 - probably the
most complete attempt to wrestle with this difficult issue in AngloAmerican jurisprudence - English judges were forced to consider
whether King Charles I had claimed a continuing, extended threat
where none in fact existed in order to circumvent legislative control
over war funding and foreign policy. Centuries later in the U.S.,
the War Powers Resolution controversy between successive Presidents and Congress, and the Iran/Contra affair also challenged us
to define, apply, and rightfully limit executive prerogative.
Now, in this post 9/11 world, the Executive response to international terrorism, including the reach of the USA Patriot Act, the
use of torture in interrogation, and special tribunals outside the
confines of ordinary constitutional due process similarly challenge
us.
If the Executive exercises prerogative too often, especially by
pretextually claiming emergency where there is none, and resting
that claim on secret information, the Constitution as a restraining
force will be corroded from within. It will be a Constitution in
36. Again, perhaps the metaphor has been inverted. Odysseus exercised his prerogative by turning over power temporarily to his men, whereas today, in emergency
situations, the Executive does not relinquish but assumes greater power.
37. While to the best of my knowledge the literature is silent on this flaw, CJ.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 638 (discussing of fear and panic, and addressing
the problem of whether a once irrational agent can be relied upon to judge that he or
she has regained rationality).
38. See LocKE, supra note 29.
39. 3 How. St. Tr. 825 (1637).
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name only. 40 On the other hand, if the Executive ignores vital necessity and fails to exercise prerogative, the entire constitutional republic may be suddenly and irrevocably destroyed from without.
We want the truth, but can we handle it? We want to hear the
Sirens but should we? Has the emergency passed? Is it time to take
the wax out of our ears, to unbind Congress, and reassess? Can we
afford to? Can we afford not to?
IV.

CONCLUSION

The story of Odysseus at the Mast ~eaches us that the earth
does not belong entirely to the living. It is, as Burke declared, a
covenant between the living, the dead, and the not yet born. Thus,
the metaphor stands profoundly for making and keeping covenants
with the dead: in constitutional interpretation, the sea anchor of
Original Intent; in the ultimate exercise of domestic sovereign
power, punishment with retribution as its primary justification. 41
Ultimately, the metaphor suggests that unless we allow the past
to bind us, the future may never become the present.
Or at least not one in which we would choose to live.

40. Sometimes the Executive itself, in Odysseus-like fashion, takes the lead in restricting its own prerogative. Elizabeth I, for example, who by later consensus, had used
executive prerogative rightly in combating the Spanish Armada, also inserted a "continuall charge to her justices ... not therefore cease to doe right in any point" even if it
meant ignoring her specific commands under seal. FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA:
ITs ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 1300-1629 244 (1948). Elster
cites Spinoza's example of the Persians who worshipped their kings as gods, yet felt
bound by the fundamental laws of the kingdom "as the king's permanent decrees, so
that his ministers render him complete obedience in refusing to execute any command
of his which contravenes them." Spinoza himself cited Ulysses "whose comrades did
execute his command in refusing, in spite of all his orders and threats, to untie him."
See ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 88 (2000). After the Phillipines terminated the Marcos
dictatorship, President Corazon Aquino, possessed of nearly unlimited power, appointed a Commission to draw up a Constitution and declared, "Nobody, not even I
your President, can overrule you." See Seth Mydans, Aquino Asks Penal to 'Be Quick' in
Preparing a New Constitution, N .Y. TIMES, June 3, 1986, at D26.
41. Although the literature is silent, Originalism and Retributivism are deeply connected - psychologically, if not philosophically.

